Last year it moved a video which showed that, when it comes to building construction, China looks far ahead of those sacred five-year plans. In fact, something fascinating happens in Beijing: you can find an empty subway entrance where there is no development, a wasteland. The reality is different, because if you return to the same place a few years later, the photo is completely different.
Yes, China is an expert in long-term planning.
For decades to come. The Chinese urban expansion of the last twenty years has consolidated a structural feature: infrastructure (particularly the metro) is built before the city exists that will do. This deliberate advancement produces a phase visible “empty”: stations buried in open fields, access through weeds without streets or commerce, deep deserted platforms under soils without residents.
However, for the Chinese State this phase is not a failure but a transitory state within a horizon of 10–20 years where infrastructure precedes to induce and anchor the development that will come. The called “ghost cities” (from Lanzhou New Area to Xiongan) are less a symptom of error than an intermediate frame of a long temporal script that assumes that urbanization is safe even though its sequence is asymmetrical: first the subway, then the people.
Station as a lever. The data from a Wuhan study show that the simple fact of having a metro nearby sharply increases the value of commercial premises within a radius of up to 400 meterseven if there is no city around yet: the line works as a future proof that can be monetized.
On a large scale, since 2008 the State launched a wave of new cities and networks (thousands of kilometers of metro in a few years) that reduced congestion and attracted investment. But this anticipated layout was not always accompanied by schools, hospitals or good last-mile connections, which stopped people from leaving the saturated centers and extended the phase in which the new areas seem empty. The infrastructure came first… and the city took longer to appear.
First there was the stop, and then Chongqing
The Chongqing case. Possibly the most publicized. Caojiawan (the “nowhere station”) condensed the thesis in image: hidden accesses among weeds without streets or residents, surveillance of the viral world, and employees recognizing minimal use “for now” with the central argument of planning: the lane anticipated the neighborhood.
Chongqing reinforces the pattern with its deep engineering (Hongtudimore than 60 meters and extension to more than 94), the extreme intermodal connection and the overinvestment in topology before demand. At the city scale, the same pattern runs through its network of viaducts and lines: radically anticipated infrastructure to induce future urban trajectories.
Lanzhou New Area Map
Ghost cities as a phase. Lanzhou New Area (with razed mountains, free zones, artificial lakes and replicas of monuments) first went through years of silence and then through a slow awakening, with the arrival of people in dribs and drabs, although there are still doubts about the figures.
Urban planners who have followed its evolution maintain that calling a “ghost city” is to confuse a phase with the final destination: these projects are conceived for 15–20 yearsnot to be judged at 3–5. In other words, the State does not build for the present, but for the moment when transportation connects, density closes and the population crosses a certain threshold. From that perspective, the initial emptiness does not clash with the bet, it is simply part of the planned schedule.
Between ambition and sustainability. Bloomberg recalled a while ago that the model has a cost: most meters they are not profitablethey increase the debt of local governments and there is a risk of building more than necessary in medium-sized cities. The national authority first relaxed the requirements (asking for less population to authorize lines) and then tightened them again and stopped projects, realizing that what helps create value can also sink finances.
Various analysts have pointed out that in many places the subway was chosen “out of inertia”, when solutions such as a good bus system with a reserved platform could have provided almost the same with much less debt. The dilemma is no longer whether there will be extensive networks (because they already exist) but whetherat what point to invest in advance it stops being a gamble and becomes a burden.
From building to operating. Once built the physical networkthe main problem is no longer digging tunnels but making that work well. There are a large number of stations with a single entrance that get stuck, long and poorly resolved transfers, lack of large connection points between lines and absence of tracks prepared for fast trains to overtake slow ones, because these decisions were not thought out from the beginning.
The same logic of “first we build and then we’ll see” now causes circulation problemssecurity, accessibility and response to extreme rains as shown by the Zhengzhou case. They counted in The Guardian that to go from “building fast” to “running well” it is necessary to redesign with the traveler’s experience in mind, not just that of the construction engineer.
The temporary strategy. In short, China has turned into a norm an idea that inverts the usual order in the West: the subway is not built because there is already a city, but so that the city exists after. The station tickets today empty are, in their logic, the first material step of future neighborhoods, within a plan that assumes long deadlines and accepts periods of emptiness as part of the price of forcing urbanization.
The risk is in the financial cost and in going from “building” to “making it work”, but the advantage is be able to capture value and shape the city in advance. What to today’s eyes seems like an unproductive excess, on a twenty-year scale is only the first phase.
A version of this article was published in November 2025
Image | Luke PusateriLanzhou Government Bulletin System, Unusual Places
GIPHY App Key not set. Please check settings