In the Persian Gulf there is an enclave of just a few square kilometers that, despite its size, became bombed hundreds of times during the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s while continuing to function as one of the main crude oil outlets in the world. Their history shows that sometimes the smallest places are also the hardest to replace.
The war is changing the verb. Over the weekend, the arrival of a second amphibious group US launch into the Gulf, with thousands of Marines on board, is not just another tactical move but rather a sign that the war is possibly coming to a head. a new phase: to open the Strait of Hormuz, Washington is no longer thinking only of bombing, but of doing something much more dangerous, taking the key territory.
How have we been countingKharg, the small island off the Iranian coast, concentrated near the 90% of exports of the country’s oil and has become the true center of gravity of the conflict, not because it is large or defensible, but because whoever controls it control the flow economy that sustains the regime. After weeks of remote attacks, the accelerated dispatch of amphibious forces indicates that the United States is preparing the option that involves boots on the ground, a qualitative leap that transforms an air campaign into a potential occupation operation.
The plan is not new, it is from 40 years ago. I remembered the financial times this morning that what today seems like an improvised escalation actually has much deeper roots, because the idea of taking Kharg is not new, but is part of a script that Trump had already outlined in the eightieswhen he openly argued that the United States should directly hit Iranian oil assets to force concessions.
So talked about “go and take the island” as a response to any challenge in the Gulf, and four decades later that same scheme (ultimatum, economic pressure and decisive use of force) reappears almost no changes. The difference is that now it is not campaign rhetoric, but a very real option on the table, turning an old strategic intuition into an operational plan with global implications.
The economic switch of war. The logic behind this move seems quite obvious: Iran has managed resist bombing and, at the same time, maintain its crude oil exports while blocking those of its rivals, turning the closure of Hormuz into an economic weapon that puts pressure on the rest of the world.
From that perspective, for the United States, taking Kharg would break that dynamic by cutting off Tehran’s main source of income and striking back in the same area, the economic one, where Iran is trying to win the war. In other words, it is not so much about destroying as to control and taketo use the island as a negotiating lever to force the reopening of the strait and, ultimately, force the regime to accept imposed conditions from outside.
The impossible operation. On paper, the capture of the island could be relatively fastsupported by previous attacks and the deployment of amphibious units capable of assaulting key points such as the airport and port facilities. However, the difficulty is not in conquering Kharg, but rather in holding it: its proximity to the Iranian coast makes it an exposed target to missiles, drones and constant attacks, while American supply lines would be vulnerable in an environment saturated with asymmetric threats.
That is to say, the scenario looks less like the traditional blitzkrieg campaigns of the Americans and more like a war of attritionwhere holding a small island can become a large-scale strategic problem.
The risk of escalation without return. Most analysts agree on the same diagnosis: the real danger is not only military, but political and economic. Such an assault operation would imply a direct escalation against the economic heart of Iran, with unforeseeable consequences: from regional attacks to energy infrastructures (Iran, in fact, has already warned with this) to a prolonged rise in oil prices and increasing pressure on the United States to exit the conflict.
Furthermore, it must be taken into account that there is no guarantee that taking the island will force Tehran to give in. In fact, it could, on the contrary, further harden its stance and widen the conflict. In this unstable balance, Kharg Island has ceased to be just a military objective and has become a strategic bet high risk for Washington: a move that could change the course of the war… or trap it in an even more dangerous phase.
Image | USN
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