Moscow

that of “50,000 Russians a month” or giving Moscow what it wants

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Throughout history, the cold has acted as a silent weapon that has changed the course of entire wars: in 1812, the Russian winter destroyed Napoleon’s army during their retreat from Moscow, causing more casualties than many battles. In the Winter War From 1939-1940, Finland used extreme temperatures and frozen terrain to hold back a vastly superior Soviet Union force, and in World War II, the winter of 1941 paralyzed the German troops at the gates of Moscow. In all cases, the cold accelerated defeats, collapsed logistics and forced decisions that were not in the original plan. Something similar is starting to happen in Ukraine. The cold as an accelerator of war. Winter has turned war into a race against time because extreme temperatures amplify the impact of each Russian attack against energy infrastructureforcing entire cities to live without heat, electricity or water for days or weeks. With minimal close to −20 °C In many enclaves, each damaged power plant, each destroyed substation or each prolonged blackout is no longer just a technical problem but is a military and political factor that shortens the margins of resistance and pushes us to make decisions that are increasingly harsh and unthinkable until recently. Energy as a goal. Since winter began in the war, Moscow has had clear your objective. Russia has systematically hit power plants, thermal plants and distribution networks again, knowing that the damage is cumulative and that repairing under constant bombing is almost as expensive as rebuilding. Ukraine, for its part, has avoided a total collapse of the system thanks to quick repairs, generators and management increasingly flexiblebut the price is enormous: buildings without heat for weeks, networks saturated when the power returns and an exhausted population that lives pending of blackout and shelter schedules improvised. Kamikaze logic. In this context, an unprecedented idea appears strongly, kyiv’s most extreme bet: to accelerate the war by attrition until it becomes unbearable for Moscow. The government has explained that the idea of ​​causing up to 50,000 Russian casualties per month It is not proposed as a slogan, but as an explicit attrition strategy to force a negotiation based on the opponent’s weakness. If you will, it is a flight forward that assumes that, if the war cannot be slowed down and winter multiplies the suffering, the only way out is to drastically raise the human cost for Russiaeven knowing that Ukraine will also pay a very high price. The limits of the war of attrition. This strategy clashes with clear structural problems: lack of infantry, shortage of drone operators and a technological competition in which Russia has cut advantagesespecially in electronic warfare and fiber optic drones. As many analysts point out, prioritizing the constant elimination of enemy soldiers can give tactical results, but it does not always solve the key problem of operating depththat is, the Russian ability to continue moving troops, ammunition and drones from the rear while the front remains stable. The invisible front. In Insider told that the cutting off of Russian access to satellite communications systems via Starlink has shown the extent to which modern warfare depends on connectivity. The interruption has generated specific disorganization in Russian units and has been celebrated in Ukraine as a key advantage, although it has also affected its own and civilian users, demonstrating that each technological gain is very fragile and requires constant management. In the middle of winter, any added failure in communications or coordination translates directly into more casualties and more chaos. The unthinkable idea. As military and climate pressure accumulates wildly, I told a few days ago the new york times that a growing part of Ukrainian society start to contemplate through surveys what was previously little more than a taboo: accepting territorial concessions in exchange for firm security guarantees. It is not yet a majority, nor even a decision made by the leadership, but the simple fact that it is being discussed reflects the extent to which the cold, blackouts and a war with no clear end are forcing a profound rethinking about what it means to win or simply survive. A dilemma pushed by winter. What seems abundantly clear is that the scheme that emerges is hard and lacking in epic some: winter is literally freezing the population Ukrainian, and its effect is accelerating the war and narrowing the options. Thus, Ukraine seems pushed to choose between maximally intensifying the kamikaze logic of the “50,000 Russians a month” to force a quick outcome or accept territorial concessions to stop the destruction before another winter just as bad or even worse. The cold does not decide on its own, there is no doubt, but it does act as the factor that has turned an already long and exhausting war into an urgent decision. Image | armyinform.com.ua, 7th Army Training Command In Xataka | “A human safari”: going outside in a Ukrainian city is now equivalent to being a shooting target for drones In Xataka | The war in Ukraine has become something absurd: there are drones shooting at Russian soldiers dressed as “penguins”

This is how Moscow wants to stop Ukrainian drone incursions

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Losing your mobile connection when entering Russia has become, in recent days, a very real possibility for those traveling to the country. It is not a blackout zone or an operator error, but a measure that is part of the new approach with which Moscow is monitoring its networks amid the conflict with Ukraine. On November 10 began to be applied in Russia a mechanism that allows you to temporarily restrict the use of certain SIM cards when they reconnect to the country’s network. According to the Ministry of Digital Developmentit is a system aimed at verifying that the line belongs to a real user and not to a device used for other purposes. The idea fits with what Minister Maksut Shadayev advanced in August, when he explained that his department was studying blocking SIMs from abroad for a few hours when crossing the border. When the SIM reappears. In the case of Russian cards, the authorities have established a mechanism that is activated when the line reconnects to the national network after having been inactive for 72 hours or after a period of roaming. During this interval, access to mobile data and the use of SMS is suspended. It is not presented as a technical failure, but rather as a preliminary check that the network executes before allowing normal use of the service. For SIM cards that arrive from abroad, the system works more directly. When the line connects to the Russian network, the same temporary blocking that we have already talked about is applied, but with a clear procedure to remove it. The user receives an SMS from the operator that explains the restriction and includes a link to complete a captcha that proves that the card is in the hands of a person. If you prefer, you can do this by phone, where the operator confirms your details before reactivating services. The drone war is also going through mobile networks. The official explanation maintains that some SIM cards with data access can be found inside enemy drones and serve as a navigation or control channel. It is not an isolated idea. In Operation Spider’s Web, described by CSISUkraine used drones equipped with 4G/LTE-based systems and autonomous flight software. Even without stating that they all work the same, this precedent shows that mobile networks have become one more element of a conflict where each communication channel counts. One more measure in a much larger mosaic. Determining the real impact of these limitations on drone raids is not easy, among other things because there is no single operating model. The CSIS analysis reflects that even in systems that rely on mobile networks, autonomy plays a key role and that the weight of connectivity can vary depending on the mission. In this context, the restrictions applied by Russia fit as another tool, the exact scope of which depends on factors that are not public and that vary from one operation to another. For users, these measures mean living with a system that introduces an additional pause every time the SIM card changes context. The impact is especially visible in border areas, where mobile phones can automatically connect to networks in other countries and activate unwanted restrictions. Authorities have recommended configuring network selection manually to avoid this. Recovering the service involves following the steps we have mentioned. Images | Xataka with Gemini 2.5 In Xataka | In Ukraine the difficult thing is not to replace a drone but its pilot. So Russia has started the hunt with something unprecedented: Rubikon

They have published the plans for the future Russian nuclear bomber. And the worst thing for Moscow is that the West now knows how to deactivate it

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The last time Russia’s bombers made the news was to verify a unprecedented assault in the Ukrainian war. It happened with the Spiderweb operation that kyiv carried out in the heart of the Moscow air bases, when a swarm of more than 100 drones hidden in trucks managed to destroy an important part of the Russian fleet of strategic bombers. The truth is that Russia was developing an unprecedented bomber to renew its fleet, although there are now doubts that it could materialize. The fragility of an industry. The international intelligence network InformNapalmin cooperation with the Fenix ​​cyber center, has revealed one of the largest information blows against the Russian military-industrial complex since the start of the war in Ukraine. The data, obtained after infiltrating the internal systems of the Russian company OKBM (key supplier of components for strategic aviation and the space sector), show Russia’s deep dependence on foreign machinery and reveal classified technical information of two programs considered pillars of its new generation aviation: the stealth bomber PAK DA “Poslannik” and the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter. And more. According to InformNapalmthe stolen files were used for months for the benefit of the Ukrainian Defense Forces and allied countries, which amplifies the impact of the leak both at the operational and political levels. Between ambition and sanctions. The PAK DA, designed by Tupolev to replace veterans Tu-95 and Tu-160represents the Russian attempt to create a subsound strategic bomber flying wing with stealth capability, intercontinental autonomy and dual nuclear and conventional capability. Conceived since the early 2000s, the project has suffered chronic delaysbudget problems and a persistent inability to consolidate a national production chain. The leaked documents include coded hydraulic system specifications like 80RSh115responsible for opening the bomb bay hatches of Poslannik-1, and confirm the existence of a classified contract between Tupolev and OKBM which requires absolute confidentiality and allows it to be terminated if state secrecy is violated. Technical documentation with engineering drawings and specifications for the RSh type box used in the PAK DA bomb bay system Extra page. Not only that. Apparently, a additional annex (called Supplementary Agreement No. 7) details the scheduling of the production phases between 2024 and 2027, a calendar that is now more than compromised by the scandal and the deterrent effect of European sanctions. Technological dependence. The filtrationFurthermore, it reveals a structural contradiction: the Kremlin’s discourse on industrial sovereignty contrasts with the reality of a system that cannot sustain its own projects. no western technology. OKBM, an essential part of the gear that produces actuators and transmission systems for the Su-57 and the PAK DA, depends on CNC machinery imported from Taiwan (Hartford HCMC-1100AG and Johnford SL-50 models) and Serbia (Grindex BSD-700U grinding machine). The equipment was purchased through subsidies from the Ministry Russian Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which shows that the State itself finances the evasion of international sanctions. This framework (a mix of obsolete engineering, technological dependence and state bureaucracy) has become a strategic vulnerability that compromises Russia’s ability to sustain complex long-term programs. Supplementary agreement confirming the continuation of the contract of the PAK DA component under the revised technical code 80RSh A failed industrial pattern. The leaked internal emails They also include documentation on RSh-65 systems of hinge and transmission used in the weapons compartments of the Su-57, the fifth generation fighter that Moscow presents as a symbol of its technological autonomy. However, the materials confirm that production remains subject to the same bottlenecks than the PAK DA: lack of critical parts, dependence on foreign suppliers and delays caused by a shortage of precision tools. Despite public investment and the expansion of plants in Kazaninternal audits attribute the delays to the departure of international manufacturers from the Russian market after the invasion of Ukraine. The political coup. After the analysis of the documentsthe European Union officially included OKBM in its 19th sanctions package on October 23, 2025, recognizing its central role in Russian strategic weapons production and restriction evasion operations. This decision, directly motivated by the findings, confirms how cyber intelligence has become a battlefield expanse: a space where the exposure of industrial vulnerability can be as decisive as a physical attack. The operation, named OKBMLeaksis announced as the first chapter in a series of publications aimed at documenting the structural dependence of the Russian military sector on foreign technology and showing the erosion of its productive capacity. The Russian mirage. He OKBM case illustrates the distance between the Kremlin’s rhetoric about self-sufficiency and the material reality of an industrial complex sustained by imported parts, inherited engineering, and a network of opaque middlemen. If the PAK DA was to symbolize Russia’s entry into a new era of strategic aviation, the leak shows that the project is today a promise threatened by sanctionsproduction necks and lack of technological substitution. The vulnerability revealed transcends the technical: it reflects the accumulated cost of two decades industry dependency global and exposes the difficulty of sustaining a prolonged war without the support of a fully autonomous industrial base. In short, the scandal not only reveals aeronautical secretsbut rather it exposes the structural fragility of contemporary military Russia, whose defense apparatus seems increasingly sophisticated in its designs, but more than precarious in its actual capacity to manufacture them. Image | Russian Defense Minister, InformNapalm In Xataka | A 20-year-old technology led Ukraine to Russian bombers. Moscow’s answer comes from China: a laser cannon In Xataka | In 2024, Ukrainian trucks disguised as “home” entered Russia. Now they have dynamited their main air bases

A ghost fleet has mapped the entire submarine structure of the EU. The question is what Moscow will do with that information

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In January 2025 United Kingdom He raised his voice At the international level. The British Secretary of Defense, John Healy, explained that a nuclear submarine and two ships from Royal Navy had sighted a spy ship in the waters of the nation, and that it was the second time in just three months. The message did not stay there. The United Kingdom gave a name and a nation behind the incursion: Yantar and Russia. Now it has been discovered that the ship has been doing much more than that. The resurgence of a war. In recent months, NATO’s attention has moved to a less visible but increasingly critical front: the European seabed. The protagonist of this new concern is, again, The Yantara Russian spy ship that, disguised as a civil ship, toured during almost 100 days The waters of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean with an accurate objective: map and monitor the submarine cables on Europe and North America for their digital communications, their financial transactions, their energy and even their most sensitive military systems. We know all this Thanks to the Financial Timesthat after an investigation based on interviews with NATO naval officers and former members of the Russian north fleet, as well as in radar images of the European Space Agency, he has confirmed that the Yantar came to be located on critical cables in the sea of ​​Ireland and in front of Norway, on the strategic route to Svalbard. The role of Gugi. The Yantar operates under the orbit of the GLAVNOYE UPRAVLENIE GLUBOKOVODNIKH ISSLEDOVII (GUGI), the director of Deep Water Research created in the Cold War and known in the West as Military Unit 40056. Based on Olenya Guba, in the Kola Peninsula, this force is located on the border between the Russian Navy and military intelligence (Gru), dedicated less to science than to espionage. Gugi has about 50 platforms (From minisubmarines capable of reaching 6,000 meters deep to nodriza ships such as Yantar), designed to place sensors, manipulate or sabotage cables and, if necessary, destroy strategic infrastructure in a conflict scenario. Despite the blows suffered (such as the submarine fire Losharik in 2019 or the death of its historic boss by Covid), the organization has continued to receive resources Even in full war of Ukraine, which has allowed to commission new spy units. The Yantar The threat in the gray zone. The reactivation of Yantar’s missions Since the end of 2023 Indicates that Moscow has abandoned the initial caution he showed after invading Ukraine. Analysts like Sidharth Kaoushal (Rusi) They point that Russia has measured NATO’s red lines and is now more willing to take risks. The plans detected in the sea of ​​Ireland, where several cables converge that connect the United Kingdom and Ireland, fit into the Russian logic to act in The so -called “Gray Zone”: Operations of covert sabotage that do not equals an open military attack but can destabilize entire societies. In fact, Western Officers They warn That Moscow could, the case, cut energy or communications to force governments to the negotiation, or even alter the temporal signals that travel through the cables, with devastating effects in sectors such as high frequency financial trade. European vulnerability. The United Kingdom obtains the 99% of its communications Digital of submarine cables and three quarters of its gas through underwater pipelines. Ireland, which does not belong to NATO, is a particularly exposed point: cutting its connections would be to isolate it from the continent without directly attacking an allied member. He parliamentary report British of September 19 warned that the country “could not guarantee an attack or recover in an acceptable period,” also criticizing the fragmentation of responsibilities between ministries. In Denmark, the case of explosions of Nord Stream in 2022 evidenced the same bureaucratic dispersion. Although London has assigned the Royal Navy the mission of Protect these infrastructureexperts point out that the lack of anti -submarine frigates and patrol dependence limit the real response capacity. The Atlantic Bastion project. To close that gap, NATO and especially the United Kingdom they consider the creation of “Atlantic Bastion”: A defensive ring of sensors, submarine drones and acoustic stations in the seabed that reinforces the control of the Greenland-Islandia-Rio-Reinian corridor. Although the plan still lacks concrete financing, its need is increasingly evident. In parallel, surveillance ships such as The British proteus They rehearse with autonomous vehicles capable of documenting the activities of the Yantar and other GGI units, with the idea of ​​exhibiting public evidence and generating deterrence. Admiral Gwyn Jenkins, head of the Royal Navy, He warned This month that Gugi, after a period of relative stillness, “is returning.” Silent war. The activity From Yantar It is not an isolated case: between autumn of 2023 and November 2024, eleven Russian ships (military and supposedly civil) held a almost constant presence in British and Irish waters. Allied intelligence services suspect that Moscow already prepares sabotage scenarios against cables as a pressure measure on the countries that arm Ukraine. While until now these operations have been maintained under the threshold of the open confrontation, the possibility of Russia “turning off” the United Kingdom or Aisle Ireland is not a crazy hypothesis. As summarized Excapitan David Fields, former British naval aggregate in Moscow: “Russian military doctrine consists of hitting first, strong and where it hurts most, to prevent the enemy from even getting rid of war.” On that silent board, the Yantar has become the key piece of a underwater chess that threatens to redefine the limits of European security. Image | Defense ImageryAndrey Luzik In Xataka | A British nuclear submarine has discovered a Russian ship in front of its submarine cables. The second time in three months In Xataka | Research on submarine cables cut in the Baltic has taken a turn: it was not Russia, it was inexperience

Ukraine has opened Moscow drone to electronic war. From Russia it only has the name, the rest is one of the allies

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The “unboxing” of Russian drones intercepted by the Ukrainian forces has revealed everything, since hidden messages until The origin of many of the technology components (with big surprises). It has also been known to what extent China is part of the war machinery or that even Nvidia has a fundamental role. Now, Moscow’s last drone, the most sophisticated, has fallen into Ukrainian hands. The last drone. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Service He has revealed Detailed information about The Geran-3a new Russian attack drone derived from the Shahed-238 Iranian. Its incorporation into Russian arsenal represents a qualitative leap against to the geran-2: Reach speeds of up to 370 km/h thanks to Your turbojet engineIt has a range of approximately 1,000 kilometers and culminates its attacks with a terminal immersion maneuver that makes it detonate when impacting. Its massive deployment this year reflects the Russian bet for Kamikaze drones increasingly sophisticated and produced in large volumes. Design and capacities. The Geran-3 maintains the basic configuration of its predecessor, including similar cameras and transmission systems, but incorporates a satellite navigation system that, According to Ukraineis resistant to TElectronic War Ecnics usual. This armor against interference is an added challenge, since it limits the effectiveness of the electronic methods that until now managed to neutralize part of the enemy drones. The internal design reproduces previous, but optimized schemes for the highest speed and to cross areas under strong anti -aircraft coverage. Dependence on the “allies.” The surprising, or perhaps at this point Not so muchis that Hur’s investigation suggests that drone contains almost 50 pieces of foreign originfrom countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany and China. This fact reveals the difficulties of controlling The proliferation of two -use technology: although international sanctions seek to limit Russia’s access to critical components, global supply chains allow pieces manufactured in the West or Asia They end in military systems through intermediaries. The case underlines, one more timethe limits of the embargo measures and the need to reinforce technological traceability. Mass production Russia ha multiplied production of drones of the Shahed family, reaching industrial levels that allow massive attacks of enormous size. In fact, offensives have already been registered with More than 800 drones In a single night and western intelligence estimates consider it possible that Moscow can launch up to 2,000 units In a single coordinated attack. In addition, new launch centers are being built, demonstrating a planned saturation strategy to wear Ukrainian defenses and force a high economic cost in your response. Ukraine and new defenses. Given this panorama, Ukraine has accelerated production of interceptor drones capable of pursuing and demolishing objectives in flight. These systems, cheaper than conventional anti-aircraft missiles, seek to balance the cost-effect equation that currently favors Russia. In parallel, they are being deployed acoustic and optical sensors For early detection, along with tactical adaptations on the ground. kyiv tries to create a flexible and low -cost antidron shield, aware that the main threat resides in the volume and persistence of these attacks. Strategic implications. The Geran-3 symbolizes The new phase of the drone war: cheap, fast and difficult systems to neutralize that force adversaries to spend much more expensive resources in their defense. This dynamic erosion classical military doctrines and demands from the West coordinate production, exchange intelligence and reinforce export controls to prevent sensitive pieces from feeding the Russian arsenal. If you want also, the conflict shows that the technological war is no longer freed with great cost strategic weapons, but with swarms of autonomous systems whose proliferation is difficult to stop. Perspectives and risks. The appearance of the Geran-3 He anticipates an escalation in which Russia will bet on mass and persistent attacks to saturate Ukrainian defenses, while kyiv and their allies look for economic and rapid solutions to counteract. Thus, each advance in speed, autonomy or resistance A electronic countermeasures multiply the risk that the balance be tilted in favor of who can sustain serial production. In that field, Ukraine needs both technological innovation and industrial and financial support of its partners, because the drone war is emerging as a decisive component of the conflict. Image | Wikimedia Commons, National Police of Ukraine In Xataka | Ukraine has opened the most advanced Drone Kamikaze in Russia. Now they know what the key to their power is: nvidia In Xataka | Ukraine has hunted an “invisible” drone of Russia. The surprise has been capitalized when opening it: it is “made in USA”

The four -day workday has found an unexpected ally in Moscow: the Ukraine War

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The conflict in Ukraine continues to reconfigure not only Geopolitics and the European Budgetsbut it will also change the working day of thousands of Russian workers. Avtovaz, one of Russia’s biggest car manufacturers, has announced that it will apply the four -day work week As of September. According to The published by Reutersthis is not a measure oriented to Improve productivity or reduce the stress levels of its workers, but adopts this measure in the middle of a strong fall in vehicle sales, a crisis of consumption due to the wear of the invasion of Ukraine and a growing pressure of exports of Chinese cars. Russia does not sell cars. Avtovaz, is the manufacturer of the acquaintances Lada. After the first months of the Ukraine War, the Russian Automobile Industry lived a brief increase in defense expense and state subsidies. However, according to data from Reutersthis situation has begun to revert quickly. Avtovaz explained through a statement sent to Russian media that their sales fell 25% in the first semester, with only 155,481 units sold, and estimates that this will be the tendency for the entire source year. Avtovaz is not the only one to consider the four -day work week as a measure for shock the crisis of the sector. According to The local pressthe Russian manufacturer Gaz (Gorkovski Avtomobilny Zavod) will also apply the four -day week on his Gorki plant, for the same reasons that Avtovaz argued. Russia’s own Minister of Economy, Maxim Reschetnikov, He warned in June that the country “is on the verge of entering recession.” Avtovaz, as a reflection of this crisis, wants to use the letter of reduction of the work week as a way of maintaining employment without increasing the number of layoffs in difficult times. No money to make them or to buy them. According to published The Moscow Times“The final decision on the introduction of a reduced work week of four days will be taken based on the results of an analysis of market trends and economic factors, including the level of the key interest rate and the availability of credit products,” said the manufacturer’s statement. The main reason that has uncontrolled this crisis (in addition to being a derivative of the conflict in Ukraine), has been the increase in interest rates, which slows so much production Like consumption. “We are talking about a high key rate and more severe demands by the regulator for those facilitating cars loans,” Avtovaz explained in his statement collected. The impact of high types not only feels Avtovaz. The Russian giant of the Seversal Steel, pointed outthat “the high basic rate and low prices” were responsible for a 55% drop in their benefits in the second quarter of the source year. That is, as I know money is expensivecompanies lose profitability and citizens purchasing power to buy cars that are manufactured, generating a chain effect that complicates economic recovery. Chinese cars are unstoppable. To the already complicated economic crisis of the automobile sector worldwide, the massive emergence of imported cars from China is added, which sell their products at such low prices that Avtovaz directly accuses a “price dumping policy.” According to company sources these marches, mostly Chinese, are increasing the market pressure with very small prices to give out more than 400,000 cars that these importers have stored in their dealers and have not yet sold. Gaz starts already, Avtovaz leaves it for September. Russian Fuentes assure that Gorki de Gaz’s factory will implement the four -day work week immediately. From July 21 to August 3, the employees of this plant will enjoy their vacations normally. During this period, several divisions of the plant will continue to operate according to their work schedule. Once they finish, the four -day work week will be implemented at least until the end of August. Avtovaz indicates that it is still analyzing the way to implement the measure, so it will enter into force for September in the factory that the company has in Togliatti, in which one in 20 inhabitants of this city works. You know what it is to work four days. Although it is not done for the reasons for productivity and well -being improvement That this model of day is usually applied, this is not the first time that Avtovaz resorts to the reduced working day to deal with a crisis. In 2022, just after the imposition of First international sanctions To Russia for the invasion of Ukraine, the company implemented a four -day work week for three months. During that same year, the sales of its flagship model, the Lada, fell 48.2%, until 174,688 units, according to data publishedby The New Voice of Ukraine. On that occasion, four -day work week served to maintain a certain level of production In an adverse scenario. Today, three years later, economic conditions remain equally complicated, so companies re -apply the same recipe. In Xataka | Three Spanish companies tell us how it has gone after implementing a job utopia: the four -day week Image | Lada, Unspash (Sten Rademaker)

Sweden did not believe Russia’s economic data. He has found the proof he was looking for by observing Moscow from space

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If the question is how Russia’s economy is doing, the answer surely depends on who you ask. A few weeks ago, The New York Times published a report where he explained the tensions that exist between the Russian elites as economic growth slows of the nation. They signed up the sanctions and the war itself, but in the face of rhetoric, Moscow responded that they would endure all threats. Sweden was not so clear, and claims to have evidence of the real situation. Stagnation and signs of slowdown. As we have told other timesthe war economy that Russia launched at full speed after the invasion of Ukraine appears to be showing signs of significant slowdown. In fact and as the Times emphasizedeven generating tensions among the country’s economic elite as the conflict enters its fourth year. According to recent official data, many civil sectors have stopped growing and have even begun to declinewhich has exacerbated economic uncertainty. The Russian currency, the ruble, fell three weeks ago to its lowest level in two yearsand companies face difficulties in obtaining new loans or receiving payments from customers, reflecting an increasingly restrictive financial environment. Rise in interest rates. The response of the Central Bank of Russia has been a drastic rise in reference interest rates, reaching 21% in October, the highest level since the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite efforts to contain inflation, the economic growth forecast for the new year has been revised downwards, standing between 0.5% and 1.5%well below the 3.5% to 4% recorded in 2024. In the background, the elephant in the room: the slowdown occurs despite the continued record government spending to finance the warwhich indicates that economic stimuli are no longer having the same effect. Economists and officials have begun to warn about the imminent risk of so-called stagflationa dangerous combination of price increase without economic growth. The impact of sanctions and the Russian response. The strict economic sanctions imposed by the West in response to the invasion of Ukraine have limited Russia’s ability to maintain its military-spending-fueled growth. In this regard, the Kremlin has insisted that it has withstood the impact of sanctions, but slowing growth and rising inflation indicate otherwise. Civilian businesses, in particular, have been hardest hit by the economic crisis. For example, Russian Railways, the country’s largest employer, reported a 9% drop in cargo volume transported last October compared to the previous year. To counteract this decline, the company has announced a price increase of more than 10% and has reduced its investment plans for 2025 by a third. Despite this, experts consider that the crisis is not yet serious enough enough to force President Vladimir Putin to reconsider his ambitions in Ukraine. Conflict Central Bank and the industrial elite. One of the main points of conflict within the Russian economic elite is the relationship between the Central Bank of Russia and the country’s leading industrialists. The bank’s governor, Elvira Nabiullina, has implemented a strict monetary policy to curb inflation, which has generated criticism from businessmenwho argue that record-high interest rates are stifling growth. In response to these, Nabiullina recently defended his strategy before Parliament, arguing that all the country’s economic resources are being used to the maximum and that macroeconomic stability should not be sacrificed for accelerated growth. However, its position has become increasingly isolated in an environment in which Business interests demand more flexible measures to sustain their operations in a context of growing uncertainty. Distrust in official figures. And in the face of domestic rhetoric, Western officials have expressed skepticism about the veracity of the economic data provided by the Kremlin, arguing that the official figures do not accurately reflect the reality of the Russian economy. In this regard, the Minister of Finance of Sweden, Elisabeth Svantesson, expressed during the World Economic Forum in Davos that Russia is presenting an image of economic stability that does not match the real situation. According to Svantesson, government statistics, which put inflation at 9.5%are not credible considering that the Central Bank of Russia has raised interest rates to 21%a discrepancy that suggests much greater inflationary pressure than is officially recognized. Furthermore, the continued flight of capital is another indicator of the country’s economic difficulties, which a priori contradicts the Kremlin’s narrative of resistance to Western sanctions. The “trick” of space. Thus, and given the lack of confidence in Russian data, Western officials have resorted to alternative methods to assess the nation’s economic health, including in the equation analysis of night satellite images of Moscow. Svantesson pointed out that city ​​lighting in 2023 was visibly dimmer compared to 2021which, in his opinion, suggests lower energy consumption and, therefore, a decline in economic activity. In fact, comparative photographs from media like Business Insider showed that, although factors such as cloud cover and time of day can influence perception, in general a pronounced decrease in illuminated areas is observed, especially in the suburbs of the capital, which could point to this deterioration in the level of life and possible cuts in the electricity supply. Manipulation of the economic narrative. Svantesson went a little further, and even emphasized that the Russian government’s official narrative seeks to convince Ukraine and its allies that sanctions have not had the desired impact. However, the data (and alternative data, such as the analysis of night lights), suggest that the economic reality is somewhat different from the image projected by Moscow. The minister concluded that, although the exact state of the Russian economy cannot be known with certainty, what is clear is that “the official version promoted by the Kremlin is not true.” Image | POT In Xataka | The end of the war is very far away for two reasons. One is arriving in Ukraine from the US, the other is an unprecedented figure in Russia In Xataka | Russia already knows how to respond to the sanctions that block its international trade: with cryptocurrencies

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