Extracting radioactive material in conflict zones is one of the more complex missions that exist and usually requires highly specialized equipment, millimeter protocols and logistics comparable to that of a large-scale military operation. Plus: unlike other interventions, it is not enough to reach the objective. Because exposure time, safety of the environment and subsequent transportation are critical factors that they condition everything.
Nuclear objective without clear plan. Officially, the United States has presented the war against Iran as an operation aimed at preventing Tehran get nuclear weaponsbut reality is stubborn and somewhat more ambiguous.
Because while the official discourse insists on eliminating this threat, operational decisions show that the focus is right now in degrading missiles and dronesnot so much in securing enriched uranium. This contradiction has generated criticism even within the own political systemby showing that there is no clear strategy to solve the key element of the problem.
The core of the problem. It we count a week ago. In reality, the critical point is not the bombed facilities, but the material that has survived to those attacks. We are talking about hundreds of kilos of highly enriched uranium that remain buried in underground complexes like Isfahan or Natanz, protected by rubble and structures designed precisely to resist attacks.
That stock, a prioriis enough to bring Iran closer to a nuclear capability if it decides to reactivate, making it the most valuable and dangerous asset in the conflict.
The strategic dilemma: leave. And here emerges the key idea that defines the entire “nuclear” situation: the United States’ problem right now is not simply to invade Iran, but survive long enough to get the uranium out of there.
The reason? Recovering that material would involve deploying hundreds or thousands of soldierssecure hostile perimeters, excavate collapsed tunnels, and operate for days under constant threat from drones, missiles, and asymmetric attacks. The difficulty, therefore, is not only in locating it, but in maintain the forces on the ground the time necessary to extract and evacuate it safely.
Extreme complexity. Experts describe this hypothetical mission as one of the most complex never raised in recent war history. Mainly because it would be necessary to coordinate special forces, engineers, protection units and air resources, in addition to create improvised infrastructure to transport the material out of the country.
All this in an environment where every minute increases the risk of casualties, sabotage or contamination, and where the operation could last longer than expected without guarantees of total success.
The uncomfortable alternative. There is, as almost always, a plan B. Given this scenario, the option that seems to prevail right now is the simplest: avoid operation and rely on deterrence. There is no doubt, this implies assuming that the uranium will remain in Iran, under indirect surveillance, with the apparent threat of new attacks if an attempt is made to recover or enrich it.
Plus: this solution does not remove the “official” problem which gave rise to an entire war, if anything it only freezes it, leaving open the possibility that the country reactivates its program in the future.
A latent risk. Under these scenarios, the result stages a conflict that has weakened capabilities visible, but has left intact the most determining elementor at least the one that has given rise to giving free rein to the war machinery to two (+1) nations.
Meanwhile, the kilos of buried uranium have become a permanent pressure factorboth for Iran and its adversaries. And, above all, it reveals a most disturbing paradox, because you can win an air war and still lose control of the central strategic objective.
Unless, of course, that wasn’t the goal.
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