In September, the future European fighter in which Spain participates began to disfigure publicly. Already in November, in a new twist of script, the European fighter began to point to something else. The latest? The Future Combat Air System project, FCAShas ceased to be solely an industrial and technological program to become an uncomfortable mirror of Europe’s ambition (and limitations).
The plane is literally at a dead end.
A symbol that wobbles. Those ambitions have was staged these days in the figure of Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz, and the Europe they aspire to. Both leaders have spent weeks redoubling a speech that insists on strategic autonomy, digital sovereignty and its own military capacity, a message that is amplified in a continent shaken by uncertainty about the American commitment and by the aggressiveness of a Kremlin that has returned conventional war to the heart of Europe.
In this context, the FCAS had been conceived as the emblem of a continent capable of compete with the F-35 American, to secure replacements for the Rafale and Eurofighter that are beginning to approach their operational end, and to demonstrate that Europe can still lead technological revolutions in defense.
Reality blow. But the rindustrial and political reality surrounding the program contradicts official rhetoric. Eight years after its presentation, FCAS is accumulating delays, internal disputes and an atmosphere of mistrust that turns each negotiation into a slow erosion of expectations, forcing us to wonder if this plane of 100,000 million of euros has not become a failed test before even taking off.
The blockages that show the seams. Behind the common façade, France and Germany carry structural rivalries that become especially visible when they must cooperate in a field as sensitive as combat aviation. Dassault and Airbus, the giants called to work side by side, have been exchanging reproaches. Eric Trappier, head of Dassault, has never hidden his refusal to give up leadership in design, nor has he hidden his disdain for German technical capacity in areas considered critical.
From the other side, Airbus accuses Dassault of protect historical privileges incompatible with a modern multinational project. The international success of the Rafale, unexpectedly converted into a symbol of independence compared to the F-35, has further strengthened the French position and has strained the distribution of burdens and responsibilities. None of these frictions are new, but they are have become more corrosive at a time when cooperation is no longer just desirable, but necessary. What should have been an alliance between equals has led to what analysts describe as a marriage of convenience full of suspicions, in which every tactile decision on intellectual property, industrial distribution or technological transfer becomes a clash of corporate cultures.
The political factor. Added to the industrial complexity is the political vulnerability of its promoters. Macron, cornered by an internal budget crisis and by the prospect of a 2027 that could hand power to the far right, has lost the ability to impose rhythms or guarantees in long-term projects.
Merz, for his part, deals with a economy that seeks to reinvent itself and with a rise of the far right which forces careful internal calibrations, but unlike France, Germany yes it has resources: Its defense budget is heading towards a doubling that transforms Berlin into the dominant partner in financial terms. This asymmetry introduces a power imbalance that irritates both Paris and the industrial partners involved.
Believe or not believe. This being the case, cooperation fundamentally requires trust, but that trust is precisely the resource that is most scarce. Without clear leadership, without a sustained common vision and without an architecture that credibly distributes risks and benefits, FCAS has become a hidden battle for influence rather than a joint project.
What no one says, but everyone thinks. They remembered on Bloomberg that, as delays increase, hypotheses begin to emerge that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. It we comment a few weeks ago, one way is to transform FCAS into an umbrella digital interoperability that allows each country to build its own plane, all connected by a common data system.
This path would allow Dassault to follow a sovereign path, while Airbus would concentrate its efforts on mission systems, companion drones and data fusion.
But there is more. Another alternative, more ambitious and politically riskier, would be to abandon the national distribution of work, which assigns tasks by flag, and move to a distribution by industrial skillsrewarding whoever can make each piece better and faster. This last option is what specialists have been asking for for years, but it is also the one that clashes head-on with the electoral incentives of each government.
European defense remains organized to maximize benefits at the national levelnot common efficiency, and as long as this does not change, they will repeat the same blocking patterns. Without deep reform, FCAS risks becoming another example of ambition being suffocated by domestic politics.
Consequences of failure. He FCAS failure It would be more than the collapse of an industrial project. It would represent a devastating message for a continent seeking to demonstrate that it can guarantee its security without completely depending on the United States. While the F-35 changes balances in the Middle East and while Europe watches, almost daily, how Russian drones penetrate western airspacethe world is moving towards a technologically different war.
The countries that lead this transition (from autonomous swarms to sixth generation platforms) will determine the correlation of power of the 21st century. Giving up on FCAS would mean accepting that Europe is late, that it is not prepared for the industrial leaps that modern conflict requires and that, despite the rhetoric of strategic autonomy, it continues to depend from external suppliers for their critical capabilities. This dependence is the same one that Macron and Merz say they want to overcome, although the failure to fulfill their own projects pushes them, step by step, towards it.
Between two waters. If you will, the outcome from FCAS It will be a litmus test for European credibility. The project was born as a symbol of autonomy, but has become a reminder that political will and industrial structure rarely advance at the same pace. If Europe wants to take its own security seriously, it is not enough to proclaim autonomy, it needs processes, rules and governance capable of sustaining it.
As long as this change does not come, large projects will continue to stumble the same obstacles. The 100 billion euro plane can still fly, but to do so it needs a runway with an “exit”, that is, for Europe to recognize that cooperation cannot be based on speeches, but rather in deep reforms. Otherwise, what was promised as a demonstration of Europe’s strategic renaissance will become a symbol of its inability to take off when it needs it most.
Image | GoodFon, Air and Space Army Ministry of Defense Spain, Counting Stars
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