Europe has been promising for years that, this time, it will take the definitive leap towards a real military autonomywith its own projects capable of competing with the great powers and reducing external dependencies. But sometimes great strategic dreams are not broken by lack of ambition, but by something much more difficult to harmonize: very different interests, priorities and visions under the same flag.
The dream of the great European fighter. we have been counting. He Future Combat Air System It was born as the great commitment of France, Germany and Spain to develop a sixth-generation fighter capable of competing with the F-35 and the emerging models of China and Russia, integrating, among other technologies, advanced stealth, artificial intelligence, swarms of drones or a digital combat cloud.
It was clearly the symbol of European strategic autonomy and the most ambitious attempt to overcome the industrial fragmentation of the continent, where several models of previous generation combat aircraft coexist while other powers advance with more integrated and technologically superior platforms.
Trapped between two giants. But what should be cooperation is turned into rivalry. Dassault, backed by Paris, demanded absolute leadership of the development of the central aircraft, while Airbus (supported by Berlin and with Spanish participation) defended a balanced distribution.
The dispute over who controls design and contracts has been eroding political trust and has delayed key decisionsto the point that the very pillar of the common fighter could be derailed, even if other parts of the system survive.
The technical clash that separates Berlin from Paris. The visible trigger is the divergence on the plane’s profile. From the sidewalk in France you look for a device with nuclear capacity and suitable to operate from aircraft carriers, consistent with its strategic doctrine and its autonomous deterrence.
It happens that from the sidewalk of Germany the perspective It’s very different. Berlin maintains that the Bundeswehr does not need such capabilities “right now” and questions whether it makes sense to design a single aircraft for such different requirements. The discussion is no longer marginal: it is structural, because it forces us to decide between a common model or two different variants.
Word of Merz. In an interview with the German political podcast “Machtwechsel”, Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that the impasse reflects fundamentally different military needs, much more than political ones. “This is not a political dispute. We have a real problem with the requirements profile. And if we cannot resolve it, we cannot maintain the project,” he declared.
Not only that. “The French need a nuclear-capable aircraft and an aircraft carrier in the next generation. The Bundeswehr does not need it for now. France wants to build just one and adapt it to its own specifications. But that is not the aircraft we need. There are other countries in Europe, Spain at least, but also others interested in talking to us about it, Merz settled.
Germany opens another door. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has gone further by publicly stating that if the disagreement is not resolved, and it does not appear that it will be, Germany could look for other partners in Europe and even reconsider whether it will need a manned fighter in two decades.
In fact, Berlin has already compromised purchase of more F-35s Americans to cover their role in NATO’s nuclear deterrent, reducing their dependence on FCAS and weakening the political urgency of keeping the program intact.
The finishing touch to the Spanish dream. For Spain, the FCAS was much more than an airplane: it represented decades of industrial workload, technological consolidation and a way to not depend exclusively of US platforms in the future. The German ambivalence It directly hits that strategy, because without the financial and political weight of Berlin the project loses critical mass and credibility.
If the common hunt is fragmented or abandoned, Spain will be faced with an uncomfortable dilemma that has slipped in recent weeks: assuming a secondary role in a reduced version, seeking new alliances or even ending up strengthening its integration with systems such as the F-35, with the consequent impact on industrial sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
Fragmented Europe. If you like, the FCAS case also exposes a broader problem: Europe spends figures comparable to the great powers, but invests less in research, duplicating systems and prioritizes national interests on economies of scale.
The inability to agree on a single new generation fighter illustrates that structural weakness. If the project ends up breaking down, not only will an industrial program fall, it will possibly also deal a blow to the narrative of a Europe capable of building its own defense architecture without depending on Washington.
Image | RawPixel
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