Carrying your ID on your cell phone is no longer a hypothesis, it is a reality in Spain. The official application MyDNI allows you to identify yourself with legal validity on a day-to-day basis, replicating in digital format several of the uses of the physical document and relying on systems such as the QR code verification. On paper, the approach is clear: simplify identification without losing guarantees. But when this technology leaves the controlled field and enters more demanding contexts, questions arise. And that is precisely what just happened.
The point of friction has not taken long to appear, and it has done so in one of the environments where any identification system is most stressed: elections. The Central Electoral Board has agreed suspend the use of MiDNI and MyDGT in electoral processes until “it is guaranteed that the control of the verification of the identity of voters by these systems is sufficiently secure.” The measure responds to a request from the Popular Party, which had warned of “doubts and social alarm” around how identity is verified in these applications, especially in the absence of additional mechanisms.
A digital advance in the face of its first major trust test
To understand where that point of friction appears, you have to look at how the system is designed. MiDNI allows you to display on the screen a version of the document with basic data such as name, photo and ID numberelements that the Central Electoral Board itself had considered valid to identify the voter.
But it also offers an additional level through a QR code that gives access to the complete DNI and whose validity is temporary. This code acts as a real-time verification mechanism, since it connects with the National Police servers. In practice, however, it is not always used and there is no general system at the tables to check it.
Until now, in fact, the Central Electoral Board itself had maintained a more flexible criterion. According to El Paíshad already rejected a similar request from the PP before the elections in Castilla y León. Interior also defended that this interpretation fit with the flexible criteria that the Board itself has been applying to facilitate voter identification, to the point of allowing voting with an expired DNI or without documentation if the members of the table know the voter personally. The change in criteria, therefore, does not come after incidents reported at the tables, but rather as a result of reopened doubts about how identity should be verified with these applications.
The case does not mean the end of the digital DNI, but it does introduce an important nuance in its development. MiDNI continues to be part of the identification digitalization process in Spain and maintains its role in different face-to-face uses. At the same time, its landing in a context such as the electoral one has reopened the debate on how identity should be verified in especially sensitive environments. The suspension agreed to by the Central Electoral Board is proposed as a temporary measure until this aspect is resolved.
Images | MiDNI Portal
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