the true enemy has the face of a “friend”
Tas the downing of the flight Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 In 2014, international investigators analyzed the remains of the missile involved and discovered that many of its parts came from production lines distributed in different countriessome originally designed for completely different uses. That analysis left an idea that is difficult to ignore, and in Ukraine hasn’t stopped to repeat again and again. A new missile, a “new” surprise. When Ukraine has been able analyze in detail one of the latest models of missiles used by Russia has happened to him like with dronesthe surprise has not come only because of its design or its capabilities, but because of what it had inside. The S-71Kone of Moscow’s most recent bets to sustain its offensive, has revealed an uncomfortable reality that is repeated on the front: beyond direct confrontation, part of the technology that makes it possible does not apply only from Russia. This realization introduces a different dimension to the conflict, one in which the origin of the components becomes a key clue to understanding how current weapons are being built. A weapon to mass produce. The S-71K is part of a new generation of air-to-ground missiles designed with a clear objective: reduce costs and facilitate volume production. Integrating existing elementslike a Cold War bomb adapted to a structure with discrete shapes to reduce its detection, the system combines relatively simple solutions with specific improvements in range and survivability. With a compact engine, a basic guide and an optimized design, it fits into a strategy that prioritize quantity available on the battlefield versus the extreme sophistication of previous models. The air intake of the S-71K engine Global and “friendly” technology. However, the most striking aspect is not in its architecture, but in its bowels. He ukrainian analysis indicates that the vast majority of its electronic components come from abroadincluding countries in Europe, especially Germany, but also in Asia and the United States. As we have been countingthis pattern is not isolated, but that repeats in other Russian systems, suggesting that, despite sanctions, Moscow continues accessing international technology through civil markets, intermediaries or indirect routes. The paradox is more than evident: in the middle of a war, part of the operation of these weapons depends on parts manufactured in countries that, in theory, seek to limit that same capacity. The real challenge. He findFurthermore, it focuses on the real difficulties of controlling the global flow of technology. Sanctions, although broad, do not always completely block access to critical components, especially when these They have civil uses and circulate in complex supply chains. For Ukraine and its allies, the problem is no longer just stopping Russian production at source, but identify and close those cracks that allow key pieces to continue arriving. In that sense, the battlefield extends far beyond the front, reaching factories, distributors and international markets. A war in supply chains. If you will also, the S-71K case illustrates how modern conflicts depend as much on global logistics as on direct military capability. As Russia seeks cheaper, more scalable solutions to keep up the pressure, Ukraine faces not only new weapons, but a system that continues to feed on distributed technology all over the world. The image that remains at the end is, to say the least, complex: the visible adversary launches the missile, but part of its effectiveness is built with pieces that travel much wider routes and are sometimes difficult to control. from “allied” territoriesturning the global economy into an indirect actor in the conflict. Image | GUR In Xataka | The war in Ukraine continues to make science fiction useless: we already have drones that kill like a hunter In Xataka | Russia has an unprecedented enemy in the Ukrainian war: Japan has just landed with a weapon to take down its shaheds