In wars, innovation is rarely born in a vacuum: it has often emerged from carefully observing the adversary. Throughout history, some of the most profound military transformations came not with entirely new weapons, but with the reinterpretation of existing technologies that changed hands. Now, in the 21st century, when the AIthe unmanned systems and the industrial production accelerated speed sets the pace of the combat, that old dynamic has once again taken center stage in a way that is as unexpected as it is revealing.
The debut of American kamikaze drones. Yes, the United States attacked Iranian territory within the framework of Operation Epic Fury together with Israel, but what was truly unprecedented was not the magnitude of the air offensive or the coordination between both countries, something that we saw very few months ago in the same scenario, but the debut in combat of the LUCASthat is, the long-range kamikaze drones used for the first time by US forces.
Launched from the ground by Task Force Scorpion Strikecreated specifically to introduce this type of capabilities in the region, the LUCAS acted as loitering munitions capable of flying long distances, staying in the zone and launching against their target in a single use. Their low cost, around tens of thousands of dollars per unit, contrasts with the price and production complexity of traditional cruise missiles, which allows them to be used in sufficient number to saturate defenses, coordinate network attacks, and maintain human oversight while operating with partial autonomy. For the first time, Washington was not only talking about cheap drones as a complement, but was actively integrating them into a real campaign against a sovereign state.
The weapon returned to its creator. The strategic key to the attack lies not only in the technology, but in its origin. It we count some time ago. He LUCAS design part directly of the Iranian Shahed-136the same model that Tehran has employed for years in the Middle East and that Russia has used brutally in Ukraine. After obtaining a copy, the device was analyzed and reengineered by American companies, adapting it to their own standards and a more networked architecture.
In essence, Washington used one of the oldest practices of warfare to bomb Iran: reverse engineering. It was not just about copying a platform, but about appropriate your logic operational (cheap weapon, long distance, volume versus exclusive precision) and turn it back against whoever popularized it. The result is a investment symbolic and even doctrinal: The country that had perfected the use of low-cost drone swarms became the target of its own reinterpreted strategic model.
Tactical surprise and demolition. If we expand the frame of the photo, the use of drones was integrated into a much broader offensive based on precise intelligence and extreme timing. He told in a report the new york times that the CIA and the Israeli services managed to identify a meeting from top Iranian commanders in Tehran, including the supreme leader, which allowed the timing of the attack to be adjusted to maximize the initial impact.
The combined operation drones, cruise missiles, long-range artillery and a massive aerial surge that sought to neutralize anti-aircraft defenses and dismantle the chain of command from the first strike. The result was the removal of key figures of the Iranian political-military apparatus and obtaining air superiority in a matter of hours. In this context, the LUCAS did not act in isolation, but as part of a distributed attack architecture that combined saturation, precision and speed to prevent an immediate coordinated response.
Cheap drones vs millions. The use of LUCAS also showed a deeper trend that the war in Ukraine has pontificated: the growing vulnerability of advanced air defense systems to cheap and numerous platforms. Iran had demonstrated that even the most sophisticated defensive architectures can be overwhelmed by waves of relatively simple drones.
The United States now applied that same logic, exploiting the cost-effect relationship to impose pressure and force the adversary to spend much more expensive resources on interceptors. If you will, the long-range kamikaze drone stops being a weapon of peripheral actors and becomes a fully integrated tool in the arsenal of a superpower, altering the traditional equation between cutting-edge technology and volume of fire.
From Rome to the missile age. The reverse engineering employed by Washington is not a modern anomaly, but rather a historical constant. In ancient times, Rome copied Carthaginian vessels to build your fleet. In the Middle AgesThey used siege machines captured, and already in World War II, rocket and bomber programs were fed by enemy technology and scientists.
One of the most famous cases was that of German V-2 ballistic missile developed by Nazi Germany at the end of World War II. Both the United States and the Soviet Union captured rockets, plans, and scientists. Washington joined Wernher von Braun in its space program, while Moscow did the same with its own equipment. That reverse engineering was the direct basis of the missile programs and, later, the space race.
And during the Cold War. Also, because both missiles and guidance systems changed hands to be disassembled and reproduced. One of the most famous cases was that of the strategic bomber B-29 Superfortress. When several American B-29s made forced landings on Soviet territory, the USSR dismantled them piece by piece and produced an almost exact copy: the Tupolev Tu-4. It was, once again, an extreme exercise in industrial reverse engineering, to the point of replicating even defects in the original design.
The pattern, as we see, repeats itself: capture, study, adapt and improve. What changes is the speed and technical complexity. In the case of the LUCASthat cycle closed in the 21st century with remarkable speed, also integrating autonomous coordination and network warfare capabilities that multiply its impact. The practice is ancient, but its execution is contemporary.
A new stage. He attack on Iran marks a turning point because it includes for the first time the United States as an active user of long-range kamikaze drones in an interstate conflict, and it does so using a system born from analysis of enemy technologyfirst from Iran, then from Russia.
This is not just another episode in the regional escalation, but rather confirmation that modern warfare combines real-time intelligence, relatively cheap weapons and doctrines inherited from the adversary. By appropriating from the Shahed model and transform it into LUCAS, Washington did not invent a new category, but he did legitimize its large-scale use within his own doctrine.
The innovation in this case was not creating something from scratch, but applying such an old rule like war itself– If the enemy has an effective weapon, make it yours and return it to them.
Image | US Central Command, US Army
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